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Pricing of Seasoned Equity Offers and Earnings Management 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study examines the relationship between earnings management by firms offering 
seasoned equity issues and the pricing of their offers. We hypothesize that seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) firms employing aggressive accounting decisions also more aggressively 
push up their offer prices, thereby leading to a decrease in the degree of underpricing. 
Consistent with our prediction (the issuer’s greed hypothesis), evidence indicates that 
SEO firms making opportunistic accounting decisions issue new shares at inflated prices. 
Our findings remain robust after controlling for other determinants of SEO underpricing 
and the possible endogeneity of pricing and earnings management.   
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I. Introduction 
Several recent studies examine discretion in financial reporting around the time of seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs). They address whether managers "overstate" earnings during the periods 
surrounding equity offers. The findings indicate that firms issuing seasoned equity report positive 
(income-increasing) discretionary accruals (unexpected accruals or abnormal accruals) around SEOs and 
have lower post-issue, long-run abnormal stock returns and operating performance (e.g., Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong (1998b), Rangan (1998)). Researchers interpret this result as being consistent with investors 
naively extrapolating pre-issue earnings without fully adjusting for the potential manipulation of reported 
earnings. They also argue that the stock market temporarily overvalues issuing firms and is subsequently 
disappointed by predictable declines in earnings caused by earnings management.1   
From a behavioral point of view, the above arguments are well grounded only when equity 
issuers benefit by manipulating their earnings. This can be achieved when the equity issuer’s cost of 
capital is substantially lower than that implied by the equilibrium asset pricing models (Denis and Sarin, 
2001). Examining the systematic relationship between equity pricing and earnings management provides 
an opportunity to address this issue directly. Equity issuers have an incentive to boost their earnings in 
order to increase their offering proceeds, which has a direct effect on the issuer’s wealth. A higher offer 
price benefits an issuer partly because the issuer can receive more cash from the offerings. Additionally, 
the higher offer price leads to less dilution of ownership if the issuing firm raises the same amount of 
money from the offerings. If the shares offered are underpriced, the issuer must sell more shares, diluting 
the existing ownership.    
In this paper, we examine the relationship between aggressive accounting decisions (e.g., 
earnings management) and the pricing of offers by firms conducting SEOs. Though underpricing of initial 
                                                 
1 Consistent with this argument, Denis and Sarin (2001) show that, on average, post-SEO earnings announcements 
are met with a significantly negative stock price reaction, meaning that a portion of the issuing firm’s poor, long-run 
performance is due to investors systematically overestimating its future earnings prospects at its offerings. 
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public offerings (IPOs) is well known, underpricing of SEOs hasn’t received much attention. Recent 
research (Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin (2003), Kim and Shin (2001), and Mola and Loughran 
(2004)) report that the underpricing of SEOs has become commonplace and that the magnitude of SEO 
underpricing has increased more dramatically in the 1990s than it did during earlier periods.2 
Consequently, in recent years, more attention has been paid to why SEOs are underpriced.   
Given the fact that SEO underpricing is a relatively obscure phenomenon, it deserves more 
explanation. When a publicly traded firm goes to the market to issue equity securities, it typically has a 
number of choices regarding the offering methods, ranging from underwritten offerings to rights 
offerings. 3 The issuer must register the issue with the SEC whenever it makes a public offering. The offer 
price of an SEO is typically set after the stock market closes on the day prior to the offer date.  
Underpricing occurs if the offer price is lower than the market’s valuation of the offering firm’s shares. 
Unlike an IPO, a pre-offer stock price exists for an SEO. As a result, researchers have used two different 
measures of SEO underpricing: offer-to-close returns and close-to-offer returns. In this paper we use 
offer-to-close returns measured as the ratio of the closing price on the offer day to the offer price, minus 
one, to provide relevant evidence to compare the underpricing of SEOs and IPOs. We also employ the 
                                                 
2 Corwin (2003) documents that SEOs were offered at a significant discount during the 1990s. For example, SEO 
underpricing increased to 2.92 percent for offers during the 1990–1998 period from 1.15 percent for offers in the 
1980s.  Kim and Shin (2001) also report that during the 1990s, approximately 80 percent of all firms’ SEO offer 
prices were lower than pre-offer day closing prices (e.g., the median and mean underpricing were 2.02 and 2.99 
percent, respectively).  
3 The two most frequently employed methods for seasoned equity issues are firm commitment underwritten 
offerings and rights offerings. Although rights offerings are much cheaper, over 90 percent of issues are 
underwritten offerings. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) document that issuers prefer the underwritten offers despite its 
significantly greater costs such as a discount. They report that direct costs for issuers average 6 (1) percent of the 
offering proceeds for firm commitment underwritten offerings (for right offerings). 
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alternative measure, close-to-offer returns measured as the ratio of offer price to the pre-offer close, 
minus one, in the sensitivity analyses.   
Specific information about SEO allocations is not publicly available. Aggarwal, Prabhala, and 
Puri (2002) find that underwriters favor institutional investors by allocating more shares in IPOs with 
stronger premarket interest (e.g., high underpricing). According to their study, institutions dominate IPO 
allocations. Approximately three-quarters of shares offered in an issue are allocated to institutions, 
thereby enabling institutions to earn greater profits on their IPO investments compared to retail investors. 
Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti (2003) report that between 1980 and 1994, the median of total institutional 
holdings in SEO firms increased by 8 percent in the offer quarter (e.g., from 27.65 percent in the quarter 
prior to the offerings to 35.65 percent in the offer quarter). Assuming all the increase in institutional 
ownership comes from the allocation of shares at the time of the offering, not from the post-offering 
acquisitions, using the median offer size in our sample (22.78 percent of shares outstanding prior to the 
offer), we estimate the proportion of seasoned equity issues allocated to the institutional investors as 71 
percent, which is similar to the allocation pattern for IPOs.   
Though previous literature implicitly assumes that equity issuers use earnings management in 
order to obtain high offering proceeds (Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), Rangan (1998), 
Shivakumar (2000)), none of the studies directly investigate this issue. DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 
(2001) find a positive correlation between pre-IPO earnings management and initial firm value, indicating 
that equity issuers manage earnings to affect the firm’s stock prices. However, the overstated earnings 
may affect either the firm’s closing price or the offer price on the day of issue, or both. DuCharme et al. 
(2001) do not specifically address which price is more influenced by the inflated earnings. Therefore no 
implication can be drawn as to the relationship between underpricing and earnings management. 
In this study, we hypothesize that SEO firms that employ aggressive accounting decisions also 
push up their offer prices more aggressively to obtain higher proceeds from their offerings, and the offer 
day closing price does not increase as much as the offer price. Since the degree of underpricing is 
empirically measured as the difference between the offer price and the closing price on the offer date, we 
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expect a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and SEO underpricing. We argue that the 
offer price increase will exceed the increase in the closing price, as issuers would want to utilize favorable 
market valuation, induced by earnings management, as much as possible. Therefore, the degree of 
underpricing with earnings management is smaller than that without earnings management.   
Our study differs from previous research in that: (1) we directly examine the relationship between 
pre-issue earnings management and the pricing of SEOs that should be the center of attention if issuers 
manage earnings to reduce the cost of capital; (2) by incorporating the degree of SEO underpricing into 
the earnings management story, our research improves the understanding of why SEO firms engage in 
earnings management prior to the offerings and how issuers’ accounting decisions affect the pricing of 
SEOs; (3) in light of the information asymmetry hypothesis, we highlight how the relationship between 
earnings management and the pricing of SEOs is influenced by the degree of information asymmetry; (4) 
assuming the underpricing, earnings management, and stock returns are jointly determined around equity 
offerings, we address the endogenous nature of these variables by employing a simultaneous equation 
approach.  
 The empirical results are consistent with our prediction: the issuer’s greed hypothesis. Our 
evidence indicates that firms opportunistically make accounting decisions also issue new shares at 
inflated prices. For a sample of SEOs from 1989 through 2000, we find a negative relationship between 
SEO underpricing and discretionary accruals. This finding suggests that seasoned equity issuers who 
adopt aggressive earnings management also push up their offer price in order to receive more proceeds 
from their offerings.  We also find that the relationship between SEO underpricing and earnings 
management is more significant for issuers with high information asymmetry than for those with low 
information asymmetry. The three-stage least square (3SLS) estimation results support that our findings 
are robust, even after incorporating possible endogeneity. In addition, we show that the above evidence 
remains unchanged across controls for other determinants of SEO underpricing. Alternative measures for 
the underpricing and discretionary accruals do not change the results.  
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  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the hypothesis and 
empirical models examined in this study. Section III discusses the empirical results. Section IV concludes 
the paper.       
II. Hypothesis and Empirical Models 
A.  Hypothesis Development: The Issuer’s Greed Hypothesis 
 Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) provide empirical evidence that IPO firms with unusually high 
discretionary current accruals (called “aggressive”earnings managers) experience poor stock return 
performance in the subsequent three years. They find that aggressive IPOs earn a cumulative abnormal 
return of approximately 20 to 30 percent less than conservative IPOs do. In another study, Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong (1998b) examine whether unusually aggressive earnings management through discretionary 
current accruals explains the long-term underperformance of seasoned equity issuers. They provide 
evidence that aggressive earnings management predict underperformance in post-issue stock returns for 
seasoned equity issuers.    
 DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001) also investigate the relationship between pre-IPO 
earnings management and subsequent stock performance. They assume that if issuers opportunistically 
manipulate earnings to increase IPO proceeds, then investors may be temporarily misled and form an 
expectation about the firm’s value that is too optimistic. Thus, the firm value should decline when the 
truth becomes apparent later. This argument can be applied to SEOs as well. Accordingly, we expect that 
seasoned equity issuers tend to make more aggressive earnings management decisions to get higher 
proceeds from their offerings. When issuers have discretion over accrual adjustments, it becomes difficult 
for investors to assess whether reported earnings are misleading. Friedlan (1994) provides evidence that 
underwriters do not detect and adjust for all accounting choices made by the equity issuers. Teoh and 
Wong (2002) also report that analysts are misled by new equity issuers’ opportunistic earnings 
management (in both IPOs and SEOs). If the market does not fully understand the extent to which SEO 
firms manage earnings, we argue that equity issuers have the incentive to push up offer prices to increase 
offering proceeds and that such an incentive may be more significant for aggressive earnings managers.  
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Prior studies suggest that discussion of underpricing issues must be based on the setting of the 
offer price and that, by overstating pre-issue earnings before an offering announcement, firms seek to 
issue their shares at higher prices (Ritter and Welch (2002), Shivakumar (2000)).4   Thus, if issuers 
aggressively manage their pre-issue earnings it seems plausible to assume that they push up their offer 
prices more aggressively as well.           
         However, the relationship between earnings management and SEO underpricing may not be 
straightforward. First, though the temporal overvaluation induced by earnings management will enable 
SEO firms to increase the offer price, it also may increase the closing price on the offer date. In this case, 
we would observe no relationship between underpricing and earnings management when the percentage 
increase in the closing price on the offer date is as much as the percentage increase in the offer price. 
Second, since underwriters engage in the determination of the offer price (i.e., they may have discretion 
over the determination of the issue price) and are better informed, the offer price may be set based on 
unmanaged earnings. If the impact of earnings management on the offer-day closing price is larger than 
that on the offer price, we may observe a positive relationship between underpricing and discretionary 
accruals (e.g., higher underpricing for the issuers who manage earnings more).     
  We, however, argue that offer price increase will exceed the increase in closing price on the offer 
date, since issuers would want to utilize favorable market valuation as much as possible especially when 
they aggressively manage earnings. Prior literature concerns cognitive biases regarding how investors 
behave. Shefrin (2000, Ch.17) argues that investors are optimistic about future prospects of equity 
                                                 
4 Shivakumar (2000) argues that it is rational for equity issuers to manage earnings before an equity offering 
announcement. He defines his hypothesis as the “managerial response hypothesis.” Specifically, his view is that 
issuers’ earnings management may actually be the rational response of issuers to anticipated market behavior at an 
offering announcement. However, his study primarily focuses on the effect of earnings management on the market 
response at offering announcements, and assumes that earnings management would be done before announcing 
equity offerings. Thus, the result cannot fully capture the effect of SEO firms’ earnings management continually 
occurring after the offering announcements. 
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offerings, which result in post-issue underperformance, and that such investor optimism is a manifestation 
of heuristic-driven bias. Ritter (2003) also asserts that heuristics make decision-making easier but they 
can sometimes lead to biases, thereby leading to suboptimal investment decisions. Thus, it seems 
plausible to assume that some greedy issuers may attempt to exploit such a bias of investors. Hirshleifer 
(2001) notes that firms sometimes take actions to exploit the market misvaluation. In the survey assessing 
the theory and evidence regarding the importance of investor psychology as a determinant of asset prices, 
he argues that security prices are related to investor misvaluation and risk.  Although issuers recently have 
become more complacent about underpricing,5 we can argue that maximizing proceeds is still one of the 
primary goals of issuing firms. Firms issuing equity can temporarily reduce their cost of capital through 
aggressive earnings decisions and high offer price if the market overvalues the equity of the firm at the 
time of the offering. In this sense, although no widely accepted theory of explaining the link between 
SEO underpricing and the issuers’ behavior on accounting decisions has been developed, we conjecture 
that the greedy equity issuers who adopt aggressive earnings decisions also have a strong desire to reduce 
the amount of underpricing in order to leave the least amount of money on the table for investors.       
  Therefore, we hypothesize that SEO firms employing aggressive accounting decisions also more 
aggressively push up their offer prices, thereby leading to a decrease in the degree of underpricing. We 
call this “issuer’s greed hypothesis” and examine it in this study. Under this hypothesis, a negative 
relationship between discretionary accruals and SEO underpricing is expected.    
B.  Measures of Underpricing and Earnings Management 
   In this study, we define underpricing as the closing market price on the offer day minus the offer 
price, divided by the offer price. Figure 1 summarizes the definitions of variables used in this study. For 
                                                 
5 Loughran and Ritter (2004) suggest two reasons: (1) the analyst has become a more important factor for issuers 
when choosing a lead underwriter (called the analyst lust hypothesis), (2) Venture capitalists and the executives of 
issuing firms have been co-opted through the setting up of personal brokerage account to which hot IPO shares are 
allocated (called the Corruption hypothesis).   
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the sensitivity analysis, we introduce another measure, discounting, as an alternative dependent variable. 
Similar to Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), discounting is defined as the closing price on the day prior to the 
offer minus the offer price, divided by the closing price on the day prior to the offer.6  
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
Following previous research, we employ discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management (Jones (1991), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Subramanyam (1996), Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong (1998a, 1998b), Rangan (1998), Hribar and Collins (2002)). We define a firm’s total accruals 
for a given quarter as the earnings before discontinued operations and extraordinary items less operating 
cash flows. Total accruals are then decomposed into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals, with the 
latter estimated from the cross-sectional modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995)): 
(1)  NDAit = a0(1/Ait-1)+ a1(∆REVit-∆RECit)/Ait-1 + a2PPEit/Ait-1                    
where NDAit is the fitted value of firm i’s nondiscretionary accruals (NDAs), deflated by lagged total 
assets, in quarter t, ∆REVit is the change in net revenues in quarter t from quarter t-1, ∆RECit is the change 
in net receivables, PPEit is gross property, plant, and equipment, and Ait-1 is lagged total assets. For each 
quarter, the parameters a0, a1, and a2 are estimated from the cross-sectional version of the original Jones 
model (1991), using all firms in each two-digit SIC code industry, excluding SEO firms:  
                                                
(2) TAit/Ait-1 = a0 (1/Ait-1) + a1(∆REVit/Ait-1) +  a2 (PPEit/Ait-1)  + eit      
where TAit is total accruals for a firm i at the quarter t, Ait-1, ∆REVit and PPEit are the same as previously 
defined, and eit is the residual error. 
After estimating NDAs, the firm’s DAs are computed as:  
(3)  DAit = TAit/Ait-1 - NDAit          
where DAit is firm i’s discretionary accruals, deflated by lagged total assets, for quarter t, and other 
variables are the same as previously defined.  
 
6  We replicate the analyses using this alternative measure as a dependent variable. The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged (to be discussed in a later section).     
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Figure 2 illustrates our timing convention. Q(-1) is the last quarter for which a financial statement 
is available at the time of the offer. Though a quarterly financial statement has to be filed within 45 days 
from the end of the quarter, and an annual financial statement should be filed within 90 days from the 
fiscal year end, Easton and Zmijewski (1993) find that more than 25 percent of the firms violate the 
statutory filling date.7 Therefore we use more generous time windows of 60 days for the quarterly 
financial statements and 120 days for the annual reports.   
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
If the end date of the quarter immediately preceding the offer date is more than 60 days prior to 
the offer date and the quarter is not the 4th quarter, it is defined as Q(-1), and naturally the quarter in 
which the offering is announced will be Q(0). If the end date of the quarter immediately preceding the 
offer date is less than 60 days prior to the offer date or the quarter is the 4th quarter, it is defined as Q(0) 
and the preceding quarter is defined as Q(-1).8 In this case, the quarter in which the offering is announced 
will be Q(+1). If the quarter immediately preceding the offer date is the 1st quarter and the end date of this 
quarter is less than 30 days from the offer date then it is defined as Q(+1), since the preceding quarter will 
be the 4th quarter and the offer date is less than 120 days after the end of the 4th quarter. The quarter before 
the 4th quarter is Q(-1). If the quarter immediately preceding the offer date is the 1st quarter and the end 
date of this quarter is more than 30 days but less than 60 days from the offer date then it is defined as Q(0).  
If issuers have a greater incentive to manage earnings in the quarter when the financial statements 
are not available at the offer date, we would expect a greater amount of positive discretionary accruals in 
the quarter Q(0). Since we do not know in which quarter firms started to engage in earnings management, 
                                                 
7 Easton and Zmijewski (1993), using a sample of 76,866 10K fillings and 193,283 10Q fillings, find that on average 
the 10K (10Q) is publicly available 97.2 (44.7) days after the fiscal year-end (quarter-end).  The third quartile of the 
reporting lag is 97 days for the 10K and 46 days for the 10Q. 
8 If the quarter immediately preceding the offer date is the 4th quarter, then the quarter before will be the 3rd quarter.  
Since there is more than 90 days between the end of this 3rd quarter and the offer date, the financial statement of the 
3rd quarter should be available at the offer date. 
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we define discretionary accruals as the sum of discretionary accruals over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0). 
For the sensitivity analysis, discretionary accruals are disaggregated into two quarterly measures: 
discretionary accruals for the quarter Q(0) and for the quarter Q(-1).   
C.  Control Variables and Model Specification 
  To reduce the possible model misspecification problem due to missing variables, we control for 
other determinants of SEO underpricing. Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that equity issuers are more 
tolerant of excessive underpricing if they simultaneously learn about a post-market valuation that is 
higher than what they expected. This suggests that the greater the recent increase in their price, the less 
bargaining effort that issuers expend in their negotiations over the offer price with underwriters.9 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model the process that lead banks in IPOs allocate more deeply underpriced 
shares to their better-informed investors to pay for information provided by them. Both of the two stories 
imply that pre-offer abnormal stock returns are positively related to the magnitude of SEO underpricing. 
In addition, other studies present evidence that when the overall stock market rallies during the road show 
period, underwriters do not fully adjust their pricing (Bradley and Jordan (2002), Loughran and Ritter 
(2002), Lowry and Schwert (2002)). To control for the effect of the pre-offer price move, we employ a 
variable, PreCAR, calculated as cumulative market-adjusted return over the period starting the day after 
the filing date and ending the day prior to the offer. Following prior studies, the sign of coefficient on 
PreCAR is predicted to be positive. 
Several prior studies document that underpricing is a function of price uncertainty and 
information asymmetry (Rock (1986), Ritter and Welch (2002), Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin 
(2003)). For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that the underpricing of equity issues must be 
explained on the basis of whether asymmetric information between the issuers and investors is assumed. 
                                                 
9  Based on the rent expropriation and share allocation story, Loughran and Ritter (2002) explain the conflict of 
interest between underwriters and issuers. They argue that if underwriters are given discretion in share allocation, 
they might intentionally leave more money on the table than necessary, then allocate these shares to favored buy-
side clients.  
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Also, investors should receive more compensation in the form of underpricing, as valuing the firm 
becomes more difficult (Rock (1986)). Corwin (2003) reports that underpricing is generally higher for 
firms with high stock return volatility and a high bid-ask spread.10 Collectively, these previous findings 
suggest that the more information asymmetry and price uncertainty, the more the SEOs are underpriced. 
In this study, we use two proxies for price uncertainty and asymmetric information. The first proxy for 
price uncertainty is Volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 trading 
days ending 11 days prior to the offer. The second proxy for information asymmetry is AvgpSprd, 
measured as the average of the percentage quoted bid-ask spreads over the 30 days ending two days prior 
to the offer. Based on the price uncertainty and asymmetric information stories, the relationship between 
underpricing and Volatility is expected to be positive. We also expect a positive relationship between 
underpricing and AvgpSprd.  
Previous research finds that underpricing is related to the offer size and the price on the day prior 
to the offer (Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin (2003), Gerard and Nanda (1993)). Altınkılıç and 
Hansen (2002) argue that, in the placement cost story, as the offering becomes more difficult to place, 
greater underpricing is needed in order to attract capital suppliers and compensate them for bearing the 
burden of greater illiquidity in their longer term investing. Based on the price pressure theory, Corwin 
(2003) argues that larger issues are more underpriced, and the effects of price pressure should be most 
pronounced for securities with relatively inelastic demand (securities with low stock price). In addition, 
Corwin (2003) provides empirical evidence of the negative relationship between underpricing and the 
pre-offer day price. We define the offer size as shares offered divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding prior to the offer. Following prior studies, we expect offersize (ln(Price)) to be positively 
(negatively) related to underpricing.    
 Mola and Loughran (2004) find that seasoned offer prices are clustered at integers and do not 
tend to fall on odd eighth fractions. Corwin (2003) argues that rounded prices may reflect the 
                                                 
10 Corwin (2003), however, reports that asymmetric information has a weak effect on the underpricing of SEOs. 
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underwriter’s desire to reduce the costs of negotiating the offer price and uncertainty about the underlying 
security value. In the presence of offer price rounding, he states that discounting (the closing price on the 
day prior to the offer minus the offer price, divided by the closing price) will be greater for low-priced 
stocks. He also holds that this effect will be most evident when the previous day’s closing price does not 
fall on an even dollar or $0.25 price increment. Though we have no reason to believe that this is also the 
case for our measure of underpricing, we add both a price-increment dummy variable, Tick, and an 
interaction term, ln(Price)*Tick, to our regressions. Based on Corwin (2003), the sign of the coefficient 
on Tick (ln(Price)*Tick) is expected to be positive (negative). Also, we include an IPO underpricing 
variable (IPOunder) in the regressions. Prior research finds that SEO underpricing is positively affected 
by IPO underpricing  (Corwin, 2003).11  Thus we expect IPOunder to be positively associated with SEO 
underpricing.   
It is well known that Nasdaq issues have different characteristics from those of the NYSE and 
other issues. Previous studies report that Nasdaq offers are more underpriced than NYSE offers (Ritter 
and Welch (2002), Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin (2003)). Thus, the dummy variable for Nasdaq 
issues with the predicted positive sign is added to our models. Together, we include the above variables in 
our regressions to control other determinants of SEO underpricing. 
  To test our hypothesis, we establish the following empirical model, including the control 
variables discussed above: 
(4)  Tick)iceln(PrOfferSizeVolatilityeCARPrDAcPr_Ud 6543210 ααααααα ++++++=  
                            NASDAQDIPOunderTick*)iceln(Pr 987 ααα +++       
                                                 
11 Loughran and Ritter (2004) show that during the 1990s, IPOs were offered at a significant discount. Such an IPO 
underpricing pattern is very similar to the pattern of SEO underpricing during the same time period. Corwin (2003) 
argues that if the relationship between underwriters and firms or the economies of the underwriting business changes 
over time, both the IPO and SEO would be affected. 
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where Ud_Prc is the closing price on the offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer price; DA is 
the discretionary total accruals over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0), divided by lagged total assets; PreCAR 
is the cumulative market-adjusted return over the period starting the day after the filing date and ending 
the day prior to the offer, where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value-weighted index; 
Volatility is standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the 
offer; OfferSize is the number of shares offered divided by the total number of shares outstanding prior to 
the offer; ln(Price) is the natural logarithm of the closing price on the day prior to the offer; Tick is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the closing price on the day prior to the offer does not fall on an even 
dollar or $0.25 price increment, and zero otherwise; IPOunder is an average IPO initial return during the 
same month as the SEO, where monthly IPO underpricing estimates are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web 
page at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm; and DNASDAQ is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
firm was listed on the Nasdaq at the time of the offer and zero otherwise. 
D. Three-stage Least Square Estimation to Test Endogenous Determination 
The relationship between underpricing and earnings management may not be unidirectional and 
these two are jointly determined.  If SEO firms opt for a higher degree of underpricing due to 
informational concerns (Rock (1986), Loderer, Sheehan, and Kadlec (1991), Gerard and Nanda (1993), 
Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991)) or information cost concerns (Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002)), 
they are unlikely to manage earnings to achieve a higher offer price. Under this scenario, greater 
underpricing will lead to a smaller degree of earnings management.   
Among the control variables introduced to address other determinants of underpricing, pre-offer 
CAR deserves special attention. Though positive, pre-offer CAR would measure the positive news about 
share price by better-informed investors (according to the share allocation, information acquisition, and 
rent expropriation story),12 it is also possible that over-optimism created by earnings management leads to 
                                                 
12 Loughran and Ritter (2002) suggest that the greater the recent increase in their market price, the less is the 
bargaining effort of issuers in their negotiations over the offer price with underwriters. 
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positive market response during the pre-offer period. The reverse also can be true. Previous research 
shows that positive news about share price may encourage SEO firms to manage their earnings to meet 
the market expectation (Kasznik (1999), Matsumoto (2002), Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999), Das 
and Zhang (2003)).13 Therefore, we address the possibility of endogeneity issues in the decision-making 
process for the pricing of equity offers. Assuming that underpricing, earnings management, and stock 
returns are jointly determined, we introduce a simultaneous equation approach with them as endogenous 
variables.     
By estimating the following equations jointly, we test for the relationship between SEO 
underpricing and earnings management behavior, while incorporating endogenous determination.   
 (5) Tick)iceln(PrOfferSizeVolatilityeCARPrDAcPr_Ud 6543210 ααααααα ++++++=  
                  NASDAQDIPOunderTick*)iceln(Pr 987 ααα +++      
(6) AbsTaccNONB)MKTCAPln(VolatilityeCARPrcPr_UdDA 6543210 6 βββββββ ++++++=    
(7) )MKTCAPln(DOfferSizeDAcPr_UdeCARPr NASDAQ 543210 δδδδδδ +++++=      
where ln(MKTCAP) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, where the market value of 
equity is defined on the day prior to the offer as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by price; 
NONB6 is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is not one of the six largest 
accounting firms, and 0 otherwise; and AbsTacc is the absolute value of total accruals. All other variables 
are defined as before.   
Prior literature (Schipper (1989), Jo and Kim (2003)) suggests that asymmetric information 
makes it possible for managers to manage earnings. Based on these studies, the coefficient on Volatility is 
                                                 
13 Kasznik (1999) shows that managers manage earnings toward their forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) reports that firms 
manage earnings to avoid missing expectations at the earnings announcement.  Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 
(1999) find evidence of earnings management to exceed financial analysts’ forecast, and Das and Zhang (2003) 
document that reported earnings per share are more likely to be rounded-up when managers ex-ante expect to round-
up to meet analysts’ forecast.  
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predicted to be positive. Under the size hypothesis, previous research suggests that large firms are more 
politically sensitive than small firms and that their earnings management is more likely to be detected 
(Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981), Watts and Zimmerman (1978)). This implies that the larger the firm, 
the more likely the manager is to choose income decreasing accounting procedures. Thus, in the DA 
equation, a negative coefficient on ln(MKTCAP) is expected.14 Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam (1998) provide empirical evidence that high quality auditors tend to deter earnings 
management, and vice versa. Based on this result, we expect the sign of NONB6 in the DA model to be 
positive. Further, Becker et al. (1998) find that there is a negative relationship between discretionary 
accruals and the absolute value of total accruals.15 Thus, a negative coefficient on AbsTacc is predicted. In 
the PreCAR equation, we control for offer size, firm size, and stock exchange.   
III. Empirical Results  
A. Sample Selection   
The sample of SEOs was obtained from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) New Issues 
Database. We collected an initial sample of U.S. common stock offerings between 1989 and 2000, 
excluding IPOs. Of these, only 3,762 offers are available on the quarterly COMPUSTAT database and the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) file. Offers without fiscal year-ends data in the 
COMPUSTAT file were excluded. This resulted in a sample of 3,099 offers. Additional restrictions were 
applied. To include an offer in a sample, we need: (1) sufficient data to compute discretionary accruals, 
and (2) data to calculate the SEO underpricing. These restrictions eliminated 1,994 offers. We also 
eliminated 65 offers due to other missing data included in regression analysis and offers trimmed at the 1st 
                                                 
14 To further control the effect of firm size on DA and PreCAR, we also include a nonlinear firm size variable, (Size-
MedSize)*D, where Size is ln (MKTCAP), MedSize is the median ln (MKTCAP), and D is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm size is larger than the median of all sample firms’ sizes and zero otherwise. We find that 
including the nonlinear size variable does not alter the results reported later.   
15 They argue that non-discretionary accruals tend to be negative due to depreciation, and thus, negative (positive) 
discretionary accruals increase (decrease) the absolute value of total accruals. 
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and 99th percentiles based on Ud_Prc, DA, and PreCAR. The final sample consists of 1,040 offers: 705 
offers by Nasdaq-listed firms and 335 offers by NYSE- and other exchange-listed firms. Table 1 presents 
the sample selection process.  
[Insert table 1 here.] 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of our sample SEOs. Panel A of this table presents the 
distribution of SEOs by industries. During the 1989-2000 period, the computer equipment, wholesales 
and retail sales, chemical products, and electronic equipment industries accounted for approximately 54 
percent of the sample SEOs. Panel B of the table shows that two of the sample years (1996 and 1997) 
were relatively active in seasoned equity issues.   
[Insert table 2 here.] 
B. Offer Date Correction   
Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) note that stated offer dates are often inappropriate for analyzing 
effects due to the fact that some offers take place after the close of trading. After examining time stamps 
from the Dow Jones News Service (DJNS), they find that 25 percent of offers take place after the close. 
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) note that even time stamps from the DJNS may not identify the true time 
of the offer. Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) and Corwin (2003) apply a volume-based offer date 
correction. Following these studies, we adjust the offer dates for our sample. If trading volume on the day 
following the SDC offer date is (i) more than twice the trading volume on the SDC offer date and (ii) 
more than twice the average daily volume over the previous 250 trading days, then the day following the 
SDC offer date is designated as the offer date. 
C.  Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the selected variables. Panel A of table 3 provides the 
summary statistics for our full sample of SEOs. For the 1989-2000 period, the mean (median) Ud_Prc is 
0.0345 (0.0135), which is significantly different from zero. This means that on average, underpricing 
consists of 3.45 percent of the offer price for the sample period. The magnitude of underpricing is similar 
to that reported by previous studies (Corwin (2003), Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002)). During the same 
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period, mean and median discretionary accruals scaled by beginning total assets are 0.0157 and 0.0089, 
respectively. These results indicate that, on average, firms offering equity boost their earnings by using 
discretionary accruals prior to the offerings. The magnitude of the DAs is statistically significant at less 
than the 1 percent level. Meanwhile, the mean (median) value of PreCAR, measured over the period 
starting the day after the filing date and ending the day prior to the offer, is –0.0187 ( –0.0305), indicating 
that equity-offering firms experience significant price declines between the filing and offer dates. This is 
also consistent with prior research (Ritter and Welch (2002), Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin 
(2003)).    
 The mean (median) value of the stock return volatility is 0.0388 (0.0346). The relative offer size, 
measured as offered shares divided by the number of pre-issue shares outstanding, is 28.72 percent. These 
statistics are also similar to those suggested by previous studies (Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin 
(2003)), while the magnitude of IPOunder, defined as an average IPO initial return during the same month 
as the SEO, is 26.58 percent for our full sample. During the 1989-2000 period, the mean (median) value 
of absolute total accruals is 4.87 (2.82) percent of the lagged total assets, and the average spread is 3.30 
percent of the bid price. 
[Insert table 3 here.] 
Panel B of table 3 reports the mean and median values for the subsamples of Nasdaq and NYSE 
and other exchange-listed offers. Columns 6-7 present the t-statistic and p-value for the test of the mean 
difference between Nasdaq issues and other issues, respectively. The last two columns of panel B present 
the Wilcoxon Z-statistic and corresponding p-value. As shown, several offer characteristics of Nasdaq 
offers are significantly different from those for other offers.   
Consistent with prior studies, the degree of underpricing for Nasdaq offers is higher than that for 
NYSE and other offers. The mean underpricing from 1989 to 2000 is 4 percent for the Nasdaq subsample 
and 2.30 percent for the other subsample. The mean difference of underpricing across markets is 
statistically significant (t-value = -3.94, Wilcoxon Z-statistic = -4.79). This is also the case for 
discretionary accruals. During the same period, Nasdaq issues show a higher level of DAs than NYSE and 
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other issues. The mean (median) DAs for Nasdaq-listed offers are 0.0170 (0.0101), while the NYSE and 
other subsample has a mean (median) DAs of 0.0050 (0.0042). This indicates that Nasdaq-listed firms are 
more aggressive earnings managers. However, the difference between Nasdaq and other issues is not 
statistically significant (t-value = -1.05, Wilcoxon Z-statistic = -1.50). In addition, Panel B shows mixed 
evidence on the difference in the price decline between Nasdaq offers and other offers. The mean PreCAR 
for Nasdaq issues is –0.0141, while that for other issues is -0.0286.16  However, this is not the case for the 
median values. The median PreCAR for Nasdaq offers is -0.0334 and -0.0292 for other offers.    
The Nasdaq subsample is also related to a higher return volatility and higher spreads than other 
exchange-listed offers. For example, the standard deviation of daily stock returns averages 4.36 percent 
for Nasdaq issues and 2.89 percent for other issues. The mean difference of Volatility across markets is 
statistically significant (t-value = -10.90, Wilcoxon Z-statistic = -13.98). The relative offer size is 28.51 
percent for Nasdaq offers and 29.16 percent for other offers. Meanwhile, the mean values of ln(Price) and 
IPOunder for Nasdaq issues are higher than those for other issues. Together, these statistics are consistent 
with prior findings (Ritter and Welch (2002), Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin (2003)).  
The information asymmetry hypothesis suggests that underpricing is a function of the degree of  
information asymmetry. Defining the bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry, we classify 
our sample into two groups (high versus low) based on the percentage of the bid-ask spread. Panel C of 
table 3 presents the mean and median values of selected variables, along with the mean difference t-test 
results and Wilcoxon Z-statistics. As predicted, the mean value of Ud_Prc for the high bid-ask spread 
subsample (0.0392) is higher than that for the low bid-ask spread subsample (0.0303). The t-statistic and 
Wilcoxon Z-statistic are -2.05 and -1.59, respectively. These are all statistically significant at 
                                                 
16 This result is different from that of the previous study. Corwin (2003) reports that Nasdaq issues are associated 
with a larger price drop than NYSE issues. This may be due to the different time windows used to measure the pre-
offer CAR. For example, Corwin measures the pre-offer CAR from day -5 to day -1, while we calculate the pre-
offer CAR using a longer time period (e.g., from the filing date to the day prior to the offer).    
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conventional levels. The statistics indicate that on average, a higher degree of asymmetric information 
leads to greater SEO underpricing. More interestingly, the level of mean DAs for firms with high bid-ask 
spreads (0.0250) are much higher than that for firms with low bid-ask spreads (0.0072). The t-statistic 
supports the relationship (t-statistic = -1.92). The result suggests that firms with high information 
asymmetry tend to adjust their earnings more aggressively than those with low information asymmetry.  
D.  Univariate Analysis    
 To gain quick insight into the relationship between underpricing and earnings management, 
selected variables are sorted into quintiles based on the magnitude of underpricing (in Panel A) and 
discretionary accruals (in Panel B). Panel A of table 4 presents the mean values of variables for each 
quintile based on the magnitude of underpricing. The quintile values are obtained by averaging the 
variables across firms within each quintile. The table also includes a t-value for the mean difference of 
each variable across extreme quintiles. In panel A of table 4, the DAs for the most aggressive earnings 
management firms are associated with the lowest quintile of underpricing, and vice versa. Moreover, the 
mean DA decreases monotonically from the lowest quintile to the highest quintile of underpricing. The 
mean DA in the lowest (highest) underpricing quintile is 0.0273 (-0.0086). In addition, the difference in 
mean DAs between the extreme quintiles is statistically significant (t-value = -2.12). Collectively, these 
results indicate that there is a negative relationship between SEO underpricing and discretionary accruals.   
[Insert table 4 here.] 
Panel B of table 4 reports the mean values of selected variables for each quintile based on the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals. Looking at the mean underpricing for the quintiles, it becomes 
obvious that underpricing is negatively associated with DAs. Offerings by firms in quintile 1 (the most 
conservative DA portfolio) tend to be underpriced the most, and vice versa. The mean underpricing in the 
most conservative (aggressive) DAs quintile is 4.35 (2.93) percent of the offer price. Also, the difference 
in mean underpricing between the most conservative and aggressive DA portfolios is statistically 
significant (t-value = -2.17). The results support that issuers who aggressively adjust DAs also reduce the 
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magnitude of underpricing. Overall, table 4 shows that SEO underpricing is decreasing in the magnitude 
of DAs, suggesting that DAs may account for a portion of the observed underpricing. 
Pearson correlation coefficients for the selected variables are reported in table 5. The correlation 
between Ud_Prc and DA is statistically significant with the predicted sign (negative). As expected, 
PreCAR, Volatility, OfferSize, IPOunder, and Avgpsprd are all significantly and positively related to 
underpricing.   
 [Insert table 5 here.] 
E.  Multiple Regression Results    
 Our hypothesis predicts that SEO underpricing would be negatively related to DAs. In this 
subsection, we examine the hypothesis after controlling for other determinants of underpricing. Table 6 
presents the results of the OLS regressions with Ud_Prc as the dependent variable.  
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
In model 1, the coefficient on DA is significant with the predicted negative sign (-0.0341, t-value 
= -3.06). This supports our hypothesis that SEO firms employing aggressive earnings decisions push up 
the offer prices, thereby reducing the degree of underpricing. Other variables show results consistent with 
previous research (Rock (1986), Ritter and Welch (2002), Loughran and Ritter (2004), Altınkılıç and 
Hansen (2002), Corwin (2003), Gerard and Nanda (1993)). The coefficient on PreCAR is positive and 
significant (0.0466, t-value = 3.89), suggesting that the greater the recent increase in their price, the less 
effort issuers expend in bargaining over the offer price with underwriters. Volatility is also positively 
associated with Ud_Prc, indicating that the greater the price uncertainty, the more the SEO is 
underpriced. Consistent with the price pressure story that more underpricing would be given to larger 
offers and offers with a relatively low stock price, the coefficient on OfferSize is significantly positive, 
and the coefficient on ln(Price) is significantly negative. IPOunder also shows a significantly positive 
coefficient, implying that an SEO is underpriced more when there is a larger IPO underpricing. In 
addition, Nasdaq offers show the greater degree of underpricing.    
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 Next, we expand our model to include the Tick variable. Corwin (2003) found a negative 
relationship between discounting and offer price rounding when price is interacted with the Tick. To 
control for this effect, we include both a price-increment dummy variable, Tick, and an interaction term, 
ln(Price)*Tick. Finally, our model incorporates a set of industry and year dummy variables to control the 
effect of any changes in underpricing across industries and time during the period, 1989-2000. Models 2-
5 in table 6 report these results. Even after including the Tick, industry, and time dummy variables, 
coefficients on DAs are consistently negative and significant in these models (t-values = -3.03, -2.99,  
-3.05, -2.75 respectively). All other variables remain virtually unchanged with the predicted signs.   
In models 2-5, coefficients on Tick are all positive and marginally significant. Coefficients on 
Tick*ln(Price) are negative but statistically insignificant except in models 2 and 3. Together, we find 
evidence consistent with the story that SEO firms managing pre-issue earnings by using discretionary 
accruals, push up their offer prices to obtain higher proceeds from their offerings, and this reduces the 
degree of underpricing.           
F.  Three-stage Least Square (3 SLS) Estimation Results  
If there is any endogeneity in decision-making regarding the pricing of SEOs and earnings 
management, the results obtained from the OLS regressions will be biased. Assuming that the 
underpricing, earnings management, and stock returns are jointly determined, we estimate a 3SLS on the 
system of simultaneous equations.17 In the first equation, we regress Ud_Prc on DA and PreCAR, as well 
as other control variables. In the second (third) equation, DA (PreCAR) is regressed on Ud_Prc and 
PreCAR (Ud_Prc and DA), and control variables.  
As discussed earlier, if SEO firms deliberately increase their earnings to receive high proceeds, 
then the coefficient on DA in the first equation should be negative. If larger pre-offer, abnormal stock 
returns lead to more underpricing, then PreCAR should bear a positive coefficient. In the second equation, 
                                                 
17 The 3SLS estimation provides consistent and efficient estimates in which several endogenous variables are 
determined simultaneously (Ramanathan, 1998).  
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if the SEO firm expecting a large underpricing due to the informational concerns has less incentive to 
manipulate earnings, then the coefficient on Ud_Prc should be negative. In addition, if the positive news 
in the market encourages earnings management, the coefficient on PreCAR in the second equation will be 
positive. If earnings management affects the market during the pre-offer period, then the coefficient on 
DA in the PreCAR equation should be positive.   
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
Table 7 reports the results. As predicted, the coefficient on DA is significantly negative in the first 
equation (-0.1698, t-value = -3.06). This result supports that even after incorporating endogeneity, 
earnings management by issuers is significantly related to the pricing of SEOs. We also find that the pre-
offer abnormal stock returns play an important role in the pricing of SEOs. The coefficient on PreCAR is 
0.8747 with a t-value of 4.26. In the DA equation, the coefficient on Ud_Prc is negative and statistically 
significant (t-value = -2.54). We interpret the result to mean that firms intending to underprice more tend 
not to manipulate earnings upward. We also find that SEO firms’ earnings management is motivated by 
pre-offer stock returns. The PreCAR bears a significantly positive coefficient (0.9556, t-value = 7.51), 
implying that positive news about the share price prior to the offerings encourages SEO firms to manage 
their earnings to meet market expectations. Meanwhile, DA in the third equation is positively related to 
PreCAR. The coefficient on DA is 0.4457 with a t-value of 3.43, meaning that earnings management 
deters price declines in the period prior to the offer. In addition, we find evidence supporting the effect of 
(expected) pricing of SEOs on the pre-offer market returns. The coefficient on Ud_Prc in the PreCAR 
equation is positive and significant (t-value=2.22). Some variables (e.g., Volatility, OfferSize, and 
IPOunder) tend to lose their statistical significance when the 3 SLS equations are estimated.  
To summarize, even after controlling for possible endogeneity, we find the evidence  consistent 
with our hypothesis. 
G.  3SLS Estimation with a Proxy for the Information Asymmetry 
As discussed earlier, underpricing is a function of information asymmetry. The amount of 
underpricing reflects investor uncertainty. Therefore, the higher the information asymmetry, the more the 
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SEOs are underpriced (Rock (1986), Ritter and Welch (2002), Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin 
(2003)).    
At the same time, SEO firms’ earnings management may be a function of information asymmetry 
as well. Schipper (1989) argues that the absence of full communication (or the existence of blocked 
communication) together with asymmetric information makes it possible for managers to manage 
earnings. In a recent study, Jo and Kim (2003) argue and find that earnings management of SEO firms are 
negatively associated with disclosure frequency since disclosure reduces information asymmetry. The 
statistics reported in panel C of table3 are consistent with their finding. Therefore, our next concern is 
with how the relationship between underpricing and earnings management would differ between 
subsamples with high and low degrees of information asymmetry. To test further, our sample is classified 
into two groups, high and low information asymmetry subsamples, based on the AvgpSprd, the average of 
percentage quoted bid ask spreads over the 30 days ending two days prior to the offer. By employing 
3SLS estimation, we again examine the relationship between underpricing and DAs for high information 
asymmetry (high bid-ask spread) firms and low information asymmetry (low bid-ask spread) firms 
separately.  
[Insert table 8 here.] 
Table 8 summarizes the results. The columns 2-4 show the results for high bid-ask spread firms.  
In the Ud_Prc equation, the coefficient on DA is negative and significant (-0.2211, t-value =-2.65). The 
last three columns report the results for the low bid-ask spread subsample. The coefficient on DA in the 
Ud_Prc model is negative but insignificant, indicating that for the sample firms with low asymmetric 
information, earnings management does not explain the underpricing of SEOs. To summarize, table 8 
suggests that the negative relationship between SEO underpricing and earnings management is more 
significant for issuers with high information asymmetry than for those with low information asymmetry.   
H.  Sensitivity Analysis 
To check the robustness of the results and to gain more insight into the issues under investigation, 
we conduct a few additional tests. All tests are based on 3SLS estimations.   
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Test with the Closing Bid Difference   
Corwin (2003) argues that the discounting of the seasoned offer is related to the underwriter 
practice of pricing at the bid quote.18  He reports that the practice of pricing at the bid has a significant 
effect on SEO discounting for Nasdaq offers, but not for NYSE issues. Though we have no reason to 
believe this is also relevant to our measure of underpricing, to see the effect of this pricing practice on our 
investigation, we extend our 3SLS equations by including two more variables, BidDiff and 
BidDiff*DNASDAQ. Panel A in table 9 presents the results.  
[Insert table 9 here.] 
 The results with the closing bid quote suggest that the two proxies for the bid pricing  
have significant effects on underpricing. In the first equation, the coefficient on BidDiff is negative and 
significant (-0.1246 with a t-value = -3.15), while BidDiff*DNASDAQ bears a significantly positive 
coefficient  (0.1173, t-value = 3.21).19 Together, these results indicate that the close-bid price difference at 
least partly explains the underpricing.  
                                                
The inference on DA in the Ud_Prc equation remains the same (t-value = -3.94), suggesting that 
the relationship between the two variables has not been impaired, even after controlling for the effect of 
bid pricing. Overall, the inclusion of a few more control variables does not alter our major conclusions, 
based on the test results reported earlier. 
Tests with an offer discount as an alternative measure of underpricing 
 Prior studies employed other measures of SEO underpricing. In Corwin (2003), the dependent 
variable, underpricing, is measured as negative one times the return from the previous day’s closing 
transaction price to the offer price. This measure is called the offer discount elsewhere in the literature 
 
18 Corwin (2003) assumes that Nasdaq issues are more likely to be priced at the previous day’s closing bid quote, 
while NYSE offers are more likely to be priced at the closing price.  
19 This result is different from that suggested by Corwin (2003). He finds that the close-bid price difference has a 
significant effect on SEO pricing only for Nasdaq issues (not for NYSE issues).  
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(Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Kim and Shin (2001)). After substituting the offer discount, Offer-Disc, 
for the dependent variable, Ud_Prc, the 3 SLS is re-estimated. The results are reported in the columns 2-4 
of Panel B of table 9. Consistent with the results reported earlier, the coefficient on DA in the offer-Disc 
equation is significantly negative (t-value =- 3.25), though Volatility and DNASDAQ   lose their statistical 
significance.  
Tests with discretionary current accruals as an alternative measure of earnings management 
 Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a and 1998b) argue that managers have greater discretion over 
current accruals than over long-term accruals.20   To check the robustness of our results reported earlier, 
we employ the current accruals model to estimate DAs and replicate the analyses (See Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong (1998a and 1998b), and Rangan (1998) for the estimation of discretionary current accruals).     
The last three columns of Panel B present the results. The results are virtually the same as before. 
In the Ud_Prc equation, discretionary current accruals (DCA) shows a negative and significant coefficient 
(-0.9760, t-value=-3.16), indicating that using an alternative proxy for earnings management does not 
alter the results reported earlier. While, the coefficient on Ud_Prc in the DCA equation is significantly 
negative as previously reported (t-value=-3.53).21  In summary, the additional tests in the above 
                                                 
20 Prior studies (e.g., Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a and 1998b) and Rangan (1998)) consider current accruals and 
long-term accruals separately when investigating earnings management around equity offerings. The current 
accruals are adjustments involving short-term assets and liabilities. For example, managers can adjust current 
accruals by advancing (or delaying) recognition of revenues (expenses). While, the long-term accruals are 
adjustments involving long-terms net assets (e.g., depreciation, deferred taxes, and realizing unusual gains).       
21 We also conduct additional tests by employing two quarterly measures of DAs: DAQ0 , and DAQ-1, where DAQ0  is 
the discretionary total accruals divided by the lagged total assets for the Q(0), and  DAQ-1  is the discretionary total 
accruals divided by the lagged total assets for the Q(-1).  Again, we find the evidence consistent with the results 
reported above.  The results are available upon request. 
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subsections suggest that our main results remain robust and the sensitivity tests do not alter our 
conclusions based on the test results reported earlier.22 
IV. Conclusion 
This study examines the relationship between earnings management by firms offering seasoned 
equity issues and the pricing of SEOs. We argue that equity issuers have an incentive to boost their 
earnings before an offering as well as push up the offer prices in order to increase offering proceeds. This 
is because the offer price in an equity offering has a direct impact on the issuer’s wealth. Ritter (1984) 
argues that earnings are a significant factor in determining the value of firms with initial public offerings 
(IPOs), indicating that the level of reported earnings may have an important implication for the pricing of 
equity offerings.   
  Evidence from recent studies suggests that seasoned equity offers tend to be significantly 
underpriced (Altınkılıç and Hansen (2002), Corwin (2003), Kim and Shin (2001), Mola and Loughran 
(2004)). At the same time, other studies document that firms manage earnings around SEOs, and there is a 
negative correlation between post-offer returns and pre-issue earnings management (Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong (1998a and 1998b), Rangan (1998), and Shivakumar (2000)). Though the above studies implicitly 
assume that issuers manage earnings to obtain higher offering proceeds, none of the studies directly 
                                                 
22 Estimation of discretionary accruals (DA) may be subject to the measurement error. That is, a portion of 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) may be misclassified as DA.  According to our hypothesis, there is no reason to 
believe that NDA bears any explanatory power in explaining the underpricing of SEOs. Therefore, any measurement 
error in estimating DAs will work against finding a significantly negative association between DA and SEO 
underpricing.  However, if there is a mechanical relationship between total accruals and the underpricing of SEOs, 
regardless of the issuer’s intention to manage earnings, observed negative relationship between DA and SEO 
underpricing may be due to such a mechanical relationship. To address this concern, we substitute DA with NDA 
and estimate the 3 SLS equations.  The estimation results, not reported, show that the SEO underpricing is not 
associated with NDA (coefficient = 0.1455, t-value = 0.32).   
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examine the relationship between earnings management and the pricing of seasoned equity offers, which 
has a direct effect on the issuer’s wealth. 
In this study, we hypothesize that SEO firms employing aggressive accounting decisions also 
more aggressively push up their offer prices.  Empirically, the degree of underpricing is defined as the 
offer price less the closing price on the offer date, scaled by the offer price. Therefore, a negative 
relationship between discretionary accruals and SEO underpricing is expected if the offer day closing 
price does not increase as much as the offer price.  
Overall, the empirical results presented here are consistent with our prediction, the issuer’s greed 
hypothesis. For a sample of SEOs from 1989 through 2000, we find that: (1) there is a negative 
relationship between SEO underpricing and discretionary accruals. This suggests that seasoned equity 
issuers actively engaging in earnings management also push up the offer price in order to receive more 
proceeds from their offerings; (2) the relationship between SEO underpricing and earnings management is 
more significant for issuers with high information asymmetry than for those with low information 
asymmetry; and (3) the 3SLS estimation results support that our results remain strong, even after 
incorporating possible endogeneity. In addition, we find that the above findings remain robust across 
controls for other determinants of SEO underpricing. Alternative measures for the underpricing and 
discretionary accruals do not change the results.  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
                                                                                                                                       Number of SEOs  
  
 Total SEOs  (between January 1989 and December 2000 from  
                   the Securities Data Corporation), which are available on  
                   the quarterly Compustat and CRSP database…………………………… 3,762 
 
  Less missing of fiscal year ends ……………………………………………  (663)  
  
Sample SEOs available ……………………………………………………. 3,099 
 
 Less missing of accounting data to compute accruals ……………………..         (1,353) 
 Less missing of data to compute SEO underpricing ……………………….      (641) 
 Less missing of other data including observations trimmed at  
                   the 1st and 99th percentiles based on Underpricing, DA, and CAR …..…             (65) 
 
 Final sample …………………………………………………………….…. 1,040  
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Table 2 
(N=1,040) 
Characteristics of Sample Firms with Seasoned Equity Offerings from 1989 to 2000 
  Panel A: Number of SEOs by Industrial Classification  
          Industry                                 SIC codes                          Number of offerings                % 
  Oil and Gas                      13      56    5.38 
  Food Products   20    15  1.44   
  Clothing     23      8  0.77   
  Paper & Paper Products  24 – 27    33   3.17 
  Chemical Products 28   107 10.29 
  Manufacturing   30 – 34    61  5.86  
  Computer Equipment & Services  35, 73               218              20.96   
  Electronic Equipment                     36                          101  9.71 
  Transportation   37, 39-42, 44-45   49  4.71 
  Scientific Instruments  38    65  6.25 
  Communications  48    44  4.23 
  Whole Sales & Retails  50-59                             133              12.79 
  Entertainment Services  70, 78-79   25   2.40     
  All others   10, 15-17,22, 29, 49, 61,                                          
                                                          67, 72, 75, 80-87, 99                      125 12.02 
    Total                                                                                                  1,040           100.00 
 
 Panel B:  Number of SEOs by Calendar Year   
 
 Year            Number of  sample SEOs         Cumulative Frequency              Cumulative  % of sample   
1989     23     23       2.21 
1990     21     44      4.23 
1991     72   116    11.15 
1992     68   184    17.69 
1993     94   278    26.73 
1994     60   338    32.50 
1995     79   417     40.10 
1996   157   550    52.88 
1997   169                707    67.98 
1998   110                817    78.56 
1999   107                924    88.85 
2000                                   116                                  1,040 100.00 
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 Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (N=1,040) 
                Percentile 
Variables  Mean (p-value) Median (p-value) Std. Dev.   75th 25th  
 
Ud_Prc 0.0345 (0.001)  0.0135 (0.001) 0.0654 0.0577 0.0000   
DA              0.0157 (0.002)   0.0089 (0.002) 0.1636 0.0642  -0.0391       
PreCAR  -0.0187 (0.001)  -0.0305 (0.001) 0.1669 0.0694  -0.1189   
Volatility 0.0388 (0.001) 0.0346 (0.001) 0.0214 0.0479 0.0250   
OfferSize 0.2872 (0.001) 0.2278 (0.001) 0.3345 0.3270 0.1421   
LnPrice 2.9891 (0.001) 3.0534 (0.001) 0.8152 3.4812 2.6027   
IPOunder 0.2658 (0.001) 0.1760 (0.001) 0.2597 0.2540 0.1153   
Ln(MKTCAP) 5.5259 (0.001) 5.4244 (0.001) 1.5351 6.4690 4.6267   
AbsTacc 0.0487 (0.001) 0.0282 (0.001) 0.0735 0.0564 0.0129   
Avgpsprd 0.0330 (0.001) 0.0181 (0.001) 0.1210 0.0312 0.0111 
 
 
 
Panel B: Mean and Median Values for Offer and Firm Characteristics across the Markets 
 
 Nasdaq Offers (N=705) NYSE & others (N=335)              t-test   Wilcoxon test 
Variables Mean Median Mean  Median   t-statistic p-value Z-statistic    p-value  
  
Ud_Prc 0.0400 0.0205 0.0230 0.0055  -3.94 0.0001 -4.79 0.0001 
DA          0.0170 0.0101   0.0050 0.0042 -1.05 0.2936  -1.50 0.0668
PreCAR  -0.0141  -0.0334  -0.0286  -0.0292 -1.31 0.1902 -0.56 0.2862
Volatility 0.0436 0.0393 0.0289 0.0248 -10.90 0.0001 -13.98 0.0001 
OfferSize 0.2851 0.2412 0.2916 0.1958  0.29 0.7713 -3.90 0.0001
LnPrice 3.0233 3.0325 2.9172 3.0796 -1.96 0.0498 -0.45 0.3281
IPOunder 0.2925 0.1830 0.2094 0.1524 -4.88 0.0001 -5.22 0.0001   
Ln(MKTCAP) 5.3970 5.2836 5.7971 5.9264  3.96 0.0001  4.77 0.0001   
AbsTacc 0.0552 0.0329 0.0351 0.0224 -4.15 0.0001 -5.25 0.0001 
Avgpsprd 0.0342 0.0190 0.0300 0.0156 -0.44 0.6585 -1.04 0.1485
 
 
 
Panel C: Mean and Median Values for Offer and Firm Characteristics by Bid-Ask Spread 
 
 High Bid-Ask Spread (N=413) Low Bid-Ask Spread (N=412)       t-test   Wilcoxon test 
Variables Mean Median Mean  Median   t-statistic p-value Z-statistic    p-value  
  
Ud_Prc 0.0392 0.0185 0.0303 0.0117  -2.05 0.0408 -1.59 0.0555 
DA          0.0250 0.0081   0.0072 0.0050 -1.92 0.0556  -0.01 0.4959 
PreCAR  -0.0365  -0.0535   0.0084  -0.0107  3.79 0.0002  3.62 0.0001
Volatility 0.0397 0.0351 0.0410 0.0358    0.85 0.3970    0.17 0.4336 
OfferSize 0.3547 0.2729 0.2098 0.1862 -6.41 0.0001 -10.14 0.0001
LnPrice 2.6807 2.7881 3.5000 3.4696  18.94 0.0001  16.91 0.0001
IPOunder 0.2077 0.1640 0.3846 0.2280  9.61 0.0001  8.30 0.0001   
Ln(MKTCAP) 4.8166 4.8760 6.5248 6.3833  20.74 0.0001  18.01 0.0001   
AbsTacc 0.0490 0.0300 0.0478 0.0280  -0.24 0.8133  -0.51 0.3043
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Ud_Prc = the closing market price on the offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer price; DA = 
discretionary total accruals over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0), divided by lagged total assets; PreCAR = cumulative 
market-adjusted return over the period starting the day after the filling date and ending the day prior to the offer,  
where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value-weighted index; Volatility = standard deviation of 
daily stock returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer; OfferSize = shares offered divided by 
total number of shares outstanding prior to the offer; ln(Price) = natural logarithm of the closing price on the day 
prior to the offer; IPOunder = average IPO initial return during the same month as the SEO, where monthly 
underpricing estimates for  IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web page at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm; 
ln(MKTCAP) = natural logarithm of market value of equity, where the market value of equity is defined on the day 
prior to the offer as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by price; AbsTacc = absolute value of total 
accruals; Avgpsprd = average of percentage quoted spreads over the 30 days ending two days prior to the offer,((ask 
– bid) /bid).  The t-value for each variable is calculated as the mean value of the NYSE and other offers (low bid-ask 
spread in Panel C) less that of Nasdaq offers (high bid-ask spread in Panel C), deflated by the related standard error. 
The p-values are based on one-tailed tests. The statistics for Avgpsprd variable are based on 825 observations due to 
the missing value of bid-ask spread. In Panel C, sample is classified as a high (low) bid-ask spread firm if the firm’s 
bid-ask spread is higher than (lower than or equal to) the median value of bid-ask spread for all sample firms.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Mean Values of Selected Variables for Five Portfolios of Sample Firms by Assigning Firms to Quintiles Based 
on the SEO Underpricing or Discretionary Accruals   
 
Panel A: Quintiles Based on the SEO Underpricing (Ud_Prc) 
  
 Portfolio Ranking    DA  PreCAR Volatility OfferSize    IPO under Avgpsprd 
              
    Lowest 0.0273 -0.0317 0.0380  0.2517 0.3001 0.0231   
          2 0.0228 -0.0360 0.0359 0.2997 0.2340 0.0294 
          3 0.0149 -0.0141 0.0330 0.2516 0.1929 0.0204 
          4 0.0033 -0.0405  0.0397 0.2738 0.2746 0.0238 
  Highest -0.0086  0.0227 0.0475 0.3591 0.3275 0.0529 
 
  t-valueH-L -2.12** 3.14*** 4.62*** 3.71*** 0.92  2.16** 
 
   
 
Panel B: Quintiles Based on the Discretionary Accruals (DA) 
 
 Portfolio Ranking Ud_Prc  PreCAR Volatility OfferSize    IPO under Avgpsprd
              
  Lowest 0.0435 -0.0241 0.0435 0.2951 0.3201 0.0328 
          2 0.0333 -0.0186 0.0359 0.3136 0.2565 0.0267 
          3 0.0283 -0.0266 0.0348 0.2664 0.2132 0.0277 
          4 0.0308 -0.0232 0.0382 0.2843 0.2373 0.0324  
Highest 0.0293 -0.0146 0.0416 0.2784 0.2944 0.0258 
   
 t-valueH-L -2.17** 0.60 -0.81 -0.68 -0.88 -0.59 
 
 
The sample consists of 1,040 offers from 1989 through 2000.  Ud_Prc = the closing market price on the offer day 
minus the offer price, divided by the offer price; DA = discretionary total accruals over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0), 
divided by lagged total assets;  PreCAR = cumulative market-adjusted return over the period starting the day after 
the filling date and ending the day prior to the offer, where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value-
weighted index; Volatility = standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior 
to the offer;  OfferSize = shares offered divided by total number of shares outstanding prior to the offer; ln(Price) = 
natural logarithm of the closing price on the day prior to the offer; IPOunder = average IPO initial return during the 
same month as the SEO, where monthly underpricing estimates for  IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web page at 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm;  Avgpsprd = average of percentage quoted spreads over the 30 days ending 
two days prior to the offer.  The t-value for each variable is calculated as the mean value difference between the 
highest rank and the lowest rank based on SEO underpricing in Panel A (DA in Panel B), divided by the related 
standard error. Mean value of Avgpsprd is computed based on 825 observations. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Pearson Correlations Among the Dependent and Selected Independent Variables   
 
 Ud_Prc          DA                PreCAR       Volatility       OfferSize        Ln (Price)       Tick           IPOunder        Avgpsprd.  
 
Ud_Prc 1.0000    
 
DA  -0.0882***     1.0000 
 
 PreCAR   0.0935***    0.0512*   1.0000  
 
Volatility 0.1679***   0.0337   0.0632**  1.0000   
 
OfferSize 0.1479***   -0.0755**  -0.0391  0.1166*** 1.0000   
 
Ln (Price) -0.0877***  0.0696**   0.2572***  -0.0516*  -0.3952*** 1.0000     
 
Tick 0.0162    -0.0011  -0.0042 0.0923*** 0.0086  -0.0293 1.0000   
 
IPOunder 0.0985***  0.0326  0.1281*** 0.3183***  -0.0989***   0.3470***  0.1034***    1.0000     
 
Avgpsprd   0.1101*** 0.0230  -0.0275 0.1605***   0.1161***  -0.2046***  -0.0155  -0.0723**  1.0000 
    
  
The sample consists of 1,040 offers from 1989 through 2000.  Ud_Prc = the closing price on the offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer price;  DA = 
discretionary total accruals divided by lagged total assets over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0);  PreCAR = cumulative market-adjusted return over the period 
starting the day after the filling date and ending the day prior to the offer,  where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value-weighted index; 
Volatility = standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer;  OfferSize = shares offered divided by total 
number of shares outstanding prior to the offer; ln (Price) = natural logarithm of the closing price on the day prior to the offer; Tick = an indicator variable that 
equals one if the closing price on the day prior to the offer doesn’t fall on even dollar or  $0.25 price increment, and zero otherwise;  IPOunder = average IPO 
initial return during the same month as the SEO, where monthly underpricing estimates for  IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web page at 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm;  Avgpsprd = average of percentage quoted spreads over the 30 days ending two days prior to the offer. Correlation of 
Avgpsprd variable is based on the 825 observations.    *, **, *** denote one-tailed significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Table 6 
  
Regressions of SEO Underpricing on Proxy for Earnings Management (DA) and on Control Variables 
 
 
           Models          1                   2                      3                           4                           5 
 
Intercept 0.0438 0.0189 0.0271 0.0356  0.0245  
   (4.40)***    (1.42)   (2.00)**   (2.41)**   (1.34) 
DA -0.0341  -0.0339  -0.0333 -0.0344  -0.0315    
 (-3.06)*** (-3.03)***  (-2.99)***  (-3.05)*** (-2.75)***  
PreCAR 0.0466 0.0481 0.0470 0.0489 0.0482    
 (3.89)***   (4.01)***  (3.93)***  (4.04)***  (3.90)*** 
Volatility 0.3541 0.4499 0.3481  0.3255 0.2782 
 (3.46)***  (4.62)***  (3.39)***  (3.06)**   (2.53)** 
 OfferSize 0.0158 0.0163 0.0162 0.0160 0.0154 
 (2.50)**   (2.57)**   (2.56)**   (2.49)** (2.37)** 
Ln(Price)   -0.0136  -0.0051  -0.0086   -0.0099 -0.0113 
 (-4.79)*** (-1.30)  (-2.09)**   (-2.37)**  (-2.63)*** 
Tick  0.0315 0.0281  0.0253  0.0259 
  (2.10)**  (1.88)*  (1.68)* (1.71)* 
Ln(Price)*Tick           -0.0088  -0.0081 -0.0072 -0.0077 
  (-1.83)*  (-1.68)*  (-1.49)   (-1.56) 
IPOunder  0.0276        0.0260  0.0264              0.0214 
   (3.24)***  (3.05)***   (3.05)***   (1.67)* 
DNASDAQ 0.0109  0.0120 0.0115  0.0110  0.0098   
  (2.51)**     (2.71)***  (2.61)***  (2.44)**  (2.13)** 
Industry Dummies No No No Yes Yes 
 
Year Dummies No No No No  Yes   
     
Adj.  2R  0.0960 0.0903 0.0975 0.0941 0.0955   
 
 
   
 The sample consists of 1,040 offers from 1989 through 2000. The following equation is estimated: 
     Tick*)iceln(PrTick)iceln(PrOfferSizeVolatilityeCARPrDAcPr_Ud 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
 
NASDAQDIPOunder 98 αα ++ , where Ud_Prc = the closing market price on the offer day minus the offer price, divided 
by the offer price;  DA  = discretionary total accruals over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0), divided by lagged total 
assets;  PreCAR = cumulative market-adjusted return over the period starting the day after the filling date and 
ending the day prior to the offer,  where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value-weighted index; 
Volatility = standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer;  
OfferSize = shares offered divided by total number of shares outstanding prior to the offer; ln (Price) = natural 
logarithm of the closing price on the day prior to the offer; Tick = an indicator variable that equals one if the closing 
price on the day prior to the offer doesn’t fall on even dollar or  $0.25 price increment, and zero otherwise; 
IPOunder = average IPO initial return during the same month as the SEO, where monthly underpricing estimates for  
IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web page at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm; DNASDAQ = an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm was listed on the NASDAQ at the time of offer and zero otherwise; and industry 
dummies are based on two-digit SIC codes.   ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent level, respectively.  
 
 
   
 
Table 7 
  
Three-stage Least Squares Estimation: Relationship Between SEO Underpricing and Earnings Management 
 
 
Dependent variable                   Ud_Prc                   DA                                   PreCAR   
 
Intercept 0.1787  0.1999 -0.1885   
   (3.84)***    (5.57)***  (-6.01)*** 
Ud_Prc   -1.2272   0.8323 
    (-2.54)**     (2.22)**  
DA -0.1698       0.4457   
  (-3.06)***      (3.43)*** 
PreCAR 0.8747  0.9556    
   (4.26)***    (7.51)***    
Volatility  -0.1298  0.3728   
  (-0.73)      (1.05)    
OfferSize   0.0012    0.0001 
  (0.13)       (0.00) 
Ln(Price)  -0.0441       
 (-3.80)***       
Tick   0.0291      
  (2.09)**         
Ln(Price)*Tick          -0.0090          
   (-2.01)**      
IPOunder   0.0043             
  (0.46)      
DNASDAQ   0.0119      0.0108    
  (2.63)***     (1.05) 
ln(MKTCAP)   -0.0230 0.0231 
    (-4.73)***  (5.53)*** 
NONB6    0.0289 
     (1.60) 
AbsTacc   -0.3223 
    (-4.22)***      
System Weighted  2R       0.0759       
 
 
The sample consists of 1,040 offers from 1989 through 2000. The following simultaneous equations are estimated: 
(1)Ud Tick*)iceln(PrTick)iceln(PrOfferSizeVolatilityeCARPrDAcPr_ 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
NASDAQDIPOunder 98
 
αα + 543210 NONB)MKTCAPln(VolatilityeCARPrcPr_UdDA+ ,  (2) 6ββββββ +++++=  
AbsTacc6β+ , and (3) Pr )MKTCAPln(DOfferSizeDAcPr_UdeCAR NASDAQ 543210 δδδδδδ +++++= , where Ud_Prc =  the 
closing market price on the offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer price; DA  = discretionary total 
accruals over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0), divided by lagged total assets;  PreCAR = cumulative market-adjusted 
return over the period starting the day after the filling date and ending the day prior to the offer, where market return 
is defined as the return on the CRSP value-weighted index; Volatility = standard deviation of daily stock returns 
over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer; OfferSize = shares offered divided by total number of 
shares outstanding prior to the offer; ln (Price) = natural logarithm of the closing price on the day prior to the offer; 
Tick = an indicator variable that equals one if the closing price on the day prior to the offer doesn’t fall on even 
dollar or  $0.25 price increment, and zero otherwise; IPOunder = average IPO initial return during the same month 
as the SEO, where monthly underpricing estimates for  IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web page at 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm; DNASDAQ = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm was listed on the 
NASDAQ at the time of offer and zero otherwise;  ln (MKTCAP) = natural logarithm of the market value of equity, 
where the market value of equity is defined on the day prior to the offer as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by price; NONB6 = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is not one of big six 
accounting firms, and zero otherwise; AbsTacc = absolute value of total accruals.  ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 8   
 
Three-stage Least Squares Estimations:  Relationship Between SEO Underpricing and Earnings 
Management for the different degrees of Information Asymmetry   
 
         High  Bid-Ask Spread                 Low Bid-Ask Spread      
 
 Dependent variable    Ud_Prc       DA              PreCAR                   Ud_Prc                DA                PreCAR   
 
Intercept 0.1467   0.2161 -0.1237  -0.0249  -0.0802  -0.2347  
  (2.08)**  (3.34)**   (-2.37)**    (-0.18)  (-1.14)   (-3.59)*** 
Ud_Prc   -0.2126  0.2539    0.9811   0.1354 
   (-0.21)    (0.56)     (1.35)   (0.19) 
DA  -0.2211    0.3342  -0.1045  -0.2420  
    (-2.65)***    (2.63)***  (-0.64) (-0.78)  
PreCAR 1.3724  1.6145   -0.1864  -0.5145  
  (2.65)***    (7.58)***   (-0.62)  (-2.94)***  
Volatility   0.4334 -0.0879   0.1439 0.2851    
    (1.51)   (-0.10)    (0.65)    (0.62)  
OfferSize    -0.0027 -0.0067   0.0811  0.1660             
   (-0.24)   (-0.54)    (1.40)    (2.17)** 
Ln (Price)  -0.0318    0.0038       
   (-1.95)*      (0.11)       
Tick   0.1475  -0.0202      
  (2.18)**      (-0.48)     
Ln (Price)*Tick          -0.0541        0.0045   
   (-2.10)**       (0.36)     
IPOunder  -0.0297     0.0366         
   (-1.00)     (2.94)***    
DNASDAQ   0.0251  0.0005   0.0177 0.0313  
 (2.04)**    (0.05)    (2.27)**   (1.33) 
ln (MKTCAP) -0.0228  0.0153   0.0107  0.0285  
  (-2.17)**     (1.83)*     (1.15)  (3.47)*** 
NONB6 0.0236    0.0597 
  (1.12)     (1.13)  
AbsTacc  -0.4753    -0.3067  
 (-3.87)***     (-2.11)**   
      
 System Weighted  2R   0.0917             0.0497     
   
 
The sample is reduced to 825 offers (413 for high bid-ask spread, and 412 for low bid-ask spread ) due to the 
missing values of the bid-ask spread (Avgpsprd) variable. The following simultaneous equations are estimated:   
 (1)Ud Tick*)iceln(PrTick)iceln(PrOfferSizeVolatilityeCARPrDAcPr_ 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
NASDAQDIPOunder 98
 
αα + )MKTCAPln(VolatilityeCARPrcPr_Ud 543210+ , (2) DA AbsTaccNONB 66 βββββββ ++++++=
MKTCAPln(DOfferSizeDAcPr_UdeCARPr NASDAQ 543210
, 
and (3) )δδδδδδ +++++= , where Ud_Prc = the closing market price 
on the offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer price;  DA  = discretionary total accruals over two 
periods, Q(-1) and Q(0), divided by lagged total assets;  PreCAR = cumulative market-adjusted return over the 
period starting the day after the filling date and ending the day prior to the offer,  where market return is defined as 
the return on the CRSP value-weighted index;  Volatility = standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 
trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer;  OfferSize = shares offered divided by total number of shares 
outstanding prior to the offer; ln (Price) = natural logarithm of the closing price on the day prior to the offer; Tick = 
an indicator variable that equals one if the closing price on the day prior to the offer doesn’t fall on even dollar or  
$0.25 price increment, and zero otherwise; IPOunder = average IPO initial return during the same month as the  
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
 
SEO, where monthly underpricing estimates for  IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web page at 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm; DNASDAQ = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm was listed on the 
NASDAQ at the time of offer and zero otherwise; ln (MKTCAP) = natural logarithm of the market value of equity, 
where the market value of equity is defined on the day prior to the offer as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by price; NONB6 = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is not one of big six 
accounting firms, and zero otherwise; AbsTacc = absolute value of total accruals. The sample is classified as a high 
(low) bid-ask spread firm if the firm’s bid-ask spread is higher than (lower than or equal to) the median value of bid-
ask spread for all sample firms. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
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Table 9  
Sensitivity Analysis: Three-stage Least Squares Estimations   
 
Panel A:  Relationship Between  SEO Underpricing and Earnings Management  After Controlling for the Closing  
                 Bid Quote   
                   
 Dependent variable                   Ud_Prc                 DA                        PreCAR   
 
Intercept   0.3047 0.1402  -0.2004  
   (5.27)***  (3.28)***   (-5.47)*** 
Ud_Prc    -0.7496 0.8769 
  (-1.24)      (2.08)** 
DA  -0.2995  0.3932  
   (-3.94)***   (2.59)***   
PreCAR   1.3881 0.6850  
   (6.18)***   (5.15)***  
Volatility  -0.2114 0.2989    
   (-1.48)    (0.75)  
OfferSize    -0.0238   0.0106             
   (-1.95)    (0.55)  
Ln (Price)  -0.0763       
   (-5.07)***      
Tick   0.0468      
      (2.85)***     
Ln(Price)*Tick            -0.0130   
    (-2.64)***   
IPOunder   -0.0140        
    (-1.48)    
DNASDAQ  0.0151  0.0040  
    (2.41)**    (0.29)  
AvgpSprd  0.0018 0.0005  -0.0014  
   (1.67)*    (0.24)   (-0.61) 
BidDiff   -0.1246  
    (-3.15)***   
BidDiff*DNASDAQ   0.1173  
     (3.21)***  
ln(MKTCAP)     -0.0151   0.0251  
   (-2.59)***    (5.21)***  
NONB6  0.0428 
   (1.84)* 
AbsTacc   -0.3783  
    (-4.43)***  
      
 System Weighted  2R     0.0702 
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Table 9  (continued) 
 
Panel B:  3 SLS Estiamtion Using Alternative Proxies for SEO Underpricing and Earnings Management 
 
 
            With Offer-Disc as Alternative Dep. Variable     With DCA as an Alternative Proxies for EM        
     
Dependent var.       Off-Disc            DA        PreCAR           Ud-Prc           DCA              PreCAR            
     
 
Intercept 0.2914 0.2158 -0.1766 0.3890 0.2050 -0.1922  
   (5.89)***  (3.73)***  (-3.93)***    (3.35)***  (7.16)***  (-7.57)*** 
Off-Disc  -2.4252  0.0994  
    (-2.44)**   (0.21)  
Ud_Prc     -1.3697 0.6597 
     (-3.53)***  (1.39) 
DA  -0.1962                              
  (-3.25)***          
DCA   -0.9760 0.9424  
    (-3.16)***   (4.63)***  
PreCAR 1.2890 0.3609    1.9887 0.8562 
   (6.30)***   (1.65)*      (3.83)*** (12.02)*** 
Volatility  -0.2535 1.3547   -0.0642 0.0263 
 (-1.26)  (2.07)**     (-0.52)  (0.23) 
 OfferSize   -0.0178  0.0364 -0.0453  0.0125     
 (-1.71)*   (1.81)*    (-1.56)  (0.82)  
Ln(Price)  -0.0717  -0.0813     
 (-5.84)***    (-3.09)***      
Tick 0.0373   0.0273     
  (2.96)***      (2.37)**     
Ln(Price)*Tick     -0.0120  -0.0064    
   (-3.00)***          (-1.98)**    
IPOunder  -0.0300       -0.0535    
   (-3.61)***    (-1.77)*     
DNASDAQ   0.0044   0.0174  0.0080  0.0121  
     (0.86)    (1.53)*          (1.01)   (1.48)  
ln(MKTCAP)   -0.0285 0.0231     -0.0187 0.0171  
   (-3.28)***    (4.01)***                   (-4.98)***  (4.91)*** 
NONB6  0.0421    0.0087 
  (1.80)*    (0.76) 
AbsTacc -0.3685     0.0391  
     (-4.11)***      (1.00) 
  
System Weighted  2R   0.0646                    0.0686       
 
 
In Panel A, the sample is reduced to 825 offers due to the missing values of the bid-ask spread (Avgpsprd) variable.  
The following simultaneous equations are estimated:  
(1)Ud Tick*)iceln(PrTick)iceln(PrOfferSizeVolatilityeCARPrDAcPr_ 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
qBidDiffNsdBidDiffAvgSprdDIPOunder NASDAQ 12111098 ααααα ++++
AbsTaccNONB)MKTCAPln(AvgSprdVolatilityeCARPrcPr_UdDA 76543210 6
 
, 
(2)
+
ββββββββ +++++++=
)MKTCAPln(AvgSprdDOfferSizeDAcPr_UdeCARPr NASDAQ 6543210
, and 
(3) δδδδδδδ ++++++= , where Ud_Prc = the closing 
market price on the offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer price; DA = discretionary total accruals  
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0), divided by lagged total assets; PreCAR = cumulative market-adjusted return over 
the period starting the day after the filling date and ending the day prior to the offer,  where market return is defined 
as the return on the CRSP value-weighted index; Volatility = standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 
trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer; OfferSize = shares offered divided by total number of shares 
outstanding prior to the offer; ln (Price) = natural logarithm of the closing price on the day prior to the offer; 
Tick =  an indicator variable that equals one if the closing price on the day prior to the offer doesn’t fall on even 
dollar or  $0.25 price increment, and zero otherwise;  IPOunder = average IPO initial return during the same month 
as the SEO, where monthly underpricing estimates for  IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web page at 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm; DNASDAQ = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm was listed on the 
NASDAQ at the time of offer and zero otherwise; AvgpSprd = average of percentage quoted spreads over the 30 
days ending two days prior to the offer; BidDiff = difference between closing transaction pirce and closing bid quote 
on the day prior to the offer, divided by closing transaction price; ln(MKTCAP) = natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity, where the market value of equity is defined on the day prior to the offer as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by price; AbsTacc = absolute value of total accruals. Number of observations is reduced to 
825 due to the missing values of the bid-ask spread (AvgpSprd) variable.  
In Panel B, the following equations are estimated:   
(1)Ud Tick*)iceln(PrTick)iceln(PrOfferSizeVolatilityeCARPrDAcPr_ 76543210 αααααααα +++++++= NASDAQDIPOunder 98 αα ++   
(2) 6543210 NONB)MKTCAPln(VolatilityeCARPrcPr_UdDA ββββββ +++++= AbsTacc6β+ , and 
(3) )MKTCAPln(DOfferSizecPr_UdDAeCARPr NASDAQ 543210 δδδδδδ +++++= .  
In the first three columns, Ud_Prc is substituted with the Off-Disc measured as the closing price on the day prior to 
the offer minus offer price, divided by the closing price on the day prior to the offer. In the last three columns, DCA 
is the discretionary current accruals that substitutes for DA.  All other variables are the same as defined in panel A. 
For the estimation including the DCA variable, total sample is increased to 1,403 because more data are available 
when current accrual model is employed to estimate DAs than when Jones and modified Jones are used.   
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Figure 1   
Variable Definitions 
    
Name               Predicted sign                                        Definition 
 
Ud_Prc  The closing market price on the offer day minus the offer price, divided  
by the offer price 
 
Offer-Disc   The closing price on the day prior to the offer minus the offer price, 
divided by the closing price on the day prior to the offer 
 
DA  - Discretionary total accruals over two periods, Q(-1) and Q(0), divided by    
                                                  lagged total assets  
 
DAQ0   -  Discretionary total accruals divided by lagged total assets for the Q(0)    
DAQ-1     -  Discretionary total accruals divided by lagged total assets for the Q( –1)  
 
PreCAR              + Cumulative market-adjusted return over the period starting the day after  
                                                 the filling date and ending the day prior to the offer, where the market 
return is defined as the return on the CRSP value-weighted index 
 
   Volatility                     + Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 trading days ending 
11 days prior to the offer 
 
OfferSize     + Shares offered divided by number of shares outstanding prior to the offer 
 
ln(Price)    - Natural logarithm of the closing price on the day prior to the offer 
 
Tick                             + An indicator variable that equals one if the closing price on the day prior  
                                                 to the offer doesn’t fall on even dollar or  $0.25 price increment, and zero 
otherwise 
 
IPOunder                    + Average IPO initial return during the same month as the SEO, where 
monthly underpricing estimates for IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s 
web page at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm 
 
   DNASDAQ                       + An indicator variable that equals one if the firm was listed on the 
NASDAQ at the time of offer and zero otherwise 
 
AvgpSprd                    + Average of percentage quoted spreads over the 30 days ending two days 
prior to the offer, (ask – bid) /bid 
 
BidDiff                        - Difference between closing transaction price and closing bid quote on the 
day prior to the offer, divided by closing transaction price 
 
ln(MKTCAP)                Natural logarithm of market value of equity, where the market value of 
equity is defined on the day prior to the offer as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by price 
 
AbsTacc   Absolute value of total accruals   
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Figure 2   
Timing Convention 
 
 
 
more than 60 days and Q-1 is not the 4th qtr                            
Q-2 Q-1 Q0         | Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
     |       |         |
SEOann   File
     |            |                                                                | 
90~180 days
lock-up period
more than 30 days but less than 60 days if Q0 is the 1st qtr,
less than 60 days if Q0 is the 2nd or 3rd qtr, or Q0 is the 4th qtr                  
Q-2 Q-1 Q0 | Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
     |       | | 
SEOann   File
     |              |                                                              | 
90~180 days
lock-up period
less than 30 days and Q+1 is the 1st qtr               
Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1         | Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
     |       |         |
SEOann   File
     |            |                                                                | 
90~180 days
lock-up period
    Offer
    Offer
 35~45 days
 waiting period
 35~45 days
 waiting period
 waiting period
 35~45 days
Offer
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